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David Little: A Modern Calvinist Architect of Human Rights  




 For the past half century, David Little has done path-breaking work in exploring 
the religious foundations and dimensions of human rights.  While working on a wide 
interreligious canvas, he has focused in especially on some of the Calvinist foundations 
of human rights, notably in the work of John Calvin, John Locke, and Roger Williams.  
This chapter offers an appreciative appraisal of Little’s contributions, and shows its 
place in the emerging scholarship on Calvinism and law and on religion and human 
rights. 
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I first read David Little’s work nearly thirty years ago in a freshman history class 
at Calvin College. Among our assigned texts was his sterling 1969 title, Religion, Order, 
and Law: A Study in Pre-Revolutionary England.1  In 225 pithy pages, he offered a 
brilliant exploration of the legal, political, and theological mind of seventeenth-century 
Puritans, and a respectful but critical engagement with Überhistorian, Max Weber. This 
book gave me a good introduction to Little’s academic style: sturdy, concise prose, 
trenchant criticism, close exegesis, engaging synthesis, and historical, theological, and 
philosophical gravitas. Here, too, was the first sustained treatment of themes that have 
remained at the center of his academic work: the notion that human rights are essential 
gifts for all persons to embrace; that religious ideas and institutions are essential allies 
in the struggle for human rights; and that Calvinists – yes, Calvinists, for all their talk of 
total depravity, covenantal duty, and predestination  – were among the chief historical 
architects of our modern human rights paradigm, anticipating the Enlightenment project 
by two centuries and anchoring a number of its cardinal teachings on human rights, 
democratic government, and rule of law in a theological world view.  You can imagine 
 
1 David Little, Religion, Order, and Law: A Study in Pre-Revolutionary England (New York and Evanston: 
Harper & Row, 1969).  
the excitement that Professor Little’s book stirred in my heart. As a young Calvinist, I 
was grateful for this blend of history, law, and Calvinist theology, well-inflected as it was 
with Weberian Wissenschaft.  And I resolved then and there in 1980: “I want to be like 
David Little when I grow up.” 
In preparation for this celebration of Professor Little, I have been reading many of 
his writings since that prized 1969 title – his dozen monographs, the scores of articles, 
reviews, and book chapters, the sundry lectures, reports, and interviews.  After 
completing my review of his works, I have resolved anew: “I want to be like David Little.”  
There is so much in his writings from which to learn:  his insightful treatment of violence 
and terrorism, nationalism and foreign policy, just war and just peace-making in such 
places as Vietnam, Ukraine, Sri Lanka, Tibet, and Iraq;2 his deep, constructive 
engagement with Islam, Buddhism, and other faiths, and his pioneering work with John 
Kelsay and Barney Twiss on developing the field of comparative religious ethics;3 his 
strong philosophical defense of a political liberalism that leaves ample room for private 
and public expressions of religion in all peaceable varieties and in all forums of public 
life, including notably in political and constitutional debate;4 his devastating criticism of 
secularists as well as of those insensitive to human rights, such as Richard Rorty,5 
Stanley Hauerwas, and Alasdair MacIntyre.6 
 
David Little on Religion and Human Rights  
The theme of religion and human rights, one of David’s abiding concerns, has 
dominated his writings since the late 1950s.  He has traced cardinal concepts like 
freedom of conscience and free exercise of religion from their earliest formulations in 
Stoic philosophy and Roman law, through the writings of Augustine and Aquinas, Luther 
and Calvin, and their many modern heirs.7  He has explored the contributions of 
 
2 David Little and Donald K. Swearer, eds., Religion and Nationalism in Iraq (Cambridge, MA: Center for 
the Study of World Religions, 2006); David Little, “Religion and Self-Determination,” in Self-Determination: 
International Perspectives, eds. Donald Clark and Robert Williamson (London: MacMillan Press, 1996), 
141-55; David Little, Ukraine: The Legacy of Intolerance (Washington, DC: United States Institute of 
Peace Press, 1991). 
3 David Little, “Religious Freedom and American Protestantism,” in Politics and Religion in France and the 
United States, eds. Alec G. Hargreaves, John Kelsay, and Sumner B. Twiss (Lanham, MD: Lexington 
Books, 2007), 29-48. 
4 David Little, “In Defense of Political Liberalism,” in Toothing Stones: Rethinking the Political, ed. Robert 
Meagher (Chicago: Swallow Press, 1972), 116-43. 
5 David Little, “Natural Rights and Human Rights: The International Imperative,” in Natural Rights and 
Natural Law: The Legacy of George Mason, ed. Robert Davidoff (Fairfax, VA: George Mason University 
Press, 1986), 95-97. 
6 David Little, “The Nature and Basis of Human Rights,” in Prospects for a Common Morality, eds. Gene 
Outka and John P. Reeder, Jr. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 73-92. 
7 David Little, Abdulaziz Sachedina, and John Kelsay, “Human Rights and the World’s Religions: 
Christianity, Islam, and Religious Liberty,” in Religious Diversity and Human Rights, eds. Irene Bloom, J. 
Paul Martin, and Wayne Proudfoot (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 225-37. 
respected Calvinists to the Western understanding of human rights and religious 
freedom, with special focus on John Calvin,8 John Locke,9 Roger Williams,10 Isaac 
Backus,11 and Thomas Jefferson,12 all of whose ideas he connects to each other and to 
the Calvinist tradition in fresh and inventive ways.  He has written astutely on the vexed 
questions, for Americans, of how to interpret and apply the First Amendment’s call for 
no government establishments of religion or prohibitions on its free exercise.  And he 
has charted many of the religious sources and dimensions of the modern human rights 
paradigm, particularly the fundamental international protections of religious freedom – 
freedom of thought, conscience, and belief, freedom from religious hatred, incitement, 
and discrimination, and freedom for religious self-determination.13  
In a moving “Personal Testament,” published in 2002, Little makes clear that his 
devotion to the field of human rights and religious freedom is not merely a dispassionate 
academic pursuit.14  For him it is a profoundly Christian commitment and calling.  He 
was born into a Presbyterian family with roots that go back to the Puritan settlers of 
Massachusetts Bay in the 1640s.  His father and grandfather, and five generations of 
Littles before them were all Presbyterian ministers well schooled in the theological arts 
of Geneva and Westminster. Little himself is a devout Presbyterian layman with an iron 
firm grip on certain “substantive necessary truths” as he calls them, echoing Hilary 
Putnam.15  
Among the fundamental “necessary truths” that drive his work in the field of 
religion and human rights are these: that each person is equally created in God’s image, 
and vested with reason and will and inherent and inviolable dignity and freedom;16 that 
each person has a moral law written on his or her conscience that serves both as a 
“private monitor” to motivate, guide, and judge their pursuit of a happy and virtuous 
life,17 and a public marker to signal God’s sovereign claims upon their inner mind, heart, 
and soul which no person or institution may trespass;18 that each person is vested with 
basic natural rights to discharge the dictates and duties of conscience, both in private 
 
8 See, e.g., David Little, “The Reformed Tradition and the First Amendment,” in The First Freedom: 
Religion and the Bill of Rights, ed. James E. Wood, Jr. (Waco, TX: J.M. Dawson Institute of Church-State 
Studies, Baylor University, 1990), 29-32; see also Little, “Religious Freedom,” 29-34. 
9 See, e.g., Little, “Natural Rights.” 
10 See, e.g., Little, “Reformed Tradition,” 29-37; Little, “Religious Freedom,” 33-38; David Little, “Roger 
Williams and the Separation of Church and State,” in Religion and the State: Essays in Honor of Leo 
Pfeffer, ed. James E. Wood, Jr. (Waco, TX: 1985), 3-23. 
11 See, e.g., Little, “The Reformed Tradition,” 21-22. 
12 See, e.g., Little, “Religious Freedom,” 37-38. 
13 See, e.g., David Little, “Conscientious Individualism: A Christian Perspective on Ethical Pluralism,” in 
The Many and the One: Religious and Secular Perspectives on Ethical Pluralism in the Modern World, 
eds. Richard Madsen and Tracy B. Strong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003). 
14 David Little, “Religion and Human Rights:  A Personal Testament,” The Journal of Law and Religion 18 
(2002-03), 57-58. 
15 Hilary Putnam, Ethics Without Ontology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 16. 
16 Little, “Roger Williams,” 8-13. 
17 Little, “Conscientious Individualism,” 232-33. 
18 In “Conscientious Individualism,” 237, Little speaks of the sovereignty of a different king over a different 
world called the “inner forum,” wherein the “laws of the spirit” reigned supreme.  
and in public, both alone and with others in peaceable communities;19 that our moral 
intuitions, shaped by these moral laws and natural rights, condemn as just plain evil 
(malum in se) the cruel logic of pain that supports grave and gratuitous assaults on the 
body through genocide, torture, mayhem, starvation, rape, and enslavement or on the 
mind through brutal coercion, pervasive mind controls, or hallucinogenic enslavement;20 
and, finally, that to protect the “rights of all humans” through both our private actions 
and political structures is the best way to live by the golden rule and to obey the first and 
greatest commandment: “to love God and to love our neighbors as ourselves.”21 
For Little, all these fundamental beliefs are foundational to a regime of human 
rights.  As formulated, they are part and product of the Christian tradition and of his own 
Calvinist world view.  These beliefs, he has shown, have been only gradually uncovered 
and actualized in the Western tradition and only after centuries of hard and cruel 
experience.  And these beliefs remain aspirational as we continue the work of 
constructing an ever sturdier human rights regime.  
But these are not merely Calvinist, or Christian, or Western beliefs, Little insists.  
Cast more generically and generously, these beliefs are the cardinal axioms of what it 
takes to live together as persons and peoples.22  Many other traditions of thought, 
conscience, and religion have their own way of formulating these fundamental beliefs 
about human nature, action, knowledge, and interaction, and have their own means of 
implementing them through personal habits and institutional structures.  And they have 
and will discover them in different ways and at different times in their development.  But, 
all that said, “it is important to remember,” Little writes, “that behind or beneath all the 
many differences among human beings in culture, religion, outlook, and knowledge, 
these are indubitable and unifying features that are accessible and applicable to ‘all 
peoples and all nations’.”23 It is on the strength of these convictions that Little calls 
fellow Christians and fellow peaceable believers of all persuasions to engage the 
regime of human rights fully, and to nurture and challenge this regime constantly to 
reform and improve itself.   
Little calls for nothing less than a comprehensive new “hermeneutic of religion 
and human rights” -- in the apt phrase of our mutual friend, Abdullahi An-Na’im. This is, 
in part, a "hermeneutic of confession."24  Given their checkered human rights records 
over the centuries, religious bodies need to acknowledge their departures from the 
 
19 See, e.g., Little, Sachedina, and Kelsay, “Christianity, Islam, and Religious Liberty,” 224-25 for a basic 
discussion of Roger Williams’ conception of moral duties.  See more fully David Little, “Religious Liberty,” 
in John Witte, Jr. and Frank S. Alexander, eds., Christianity and Law: An Introduction (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), 249-270. 
20 See, e.g., Little, “Natural Rights and Human Rights,” 96-102. 
21 See, e.g., David Little, “A Christian Perspective on Human Rights,” in Human Rights in Africa, eds. 
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Naim and Francis M. Deng (Washington, DC:  Brookings Institution, 1990), 67. 
22 Little, “Natural Rights,” 68-69. 
23 Little, “Natural Rights,” 70. 
24 The discussion of the three aspects of this new hermeneutic is taken from John Witte, Jr., God’s Joust, 
God’s Justice:  Law and Religion in the Western Tradition (Grand Rapids, MI:  Eerdmans, 2006), chap. 3. 
cardinal teachings of peace and love that are the heart of their sacred texts and 
traditions.  The blood of many thousands is at the doors of our churches, temples, 
mosques, and synagogues, and this demands humble recognition, expiation, and 
restitution.  This is, in part, a "hermeneutic of suspicion" (in Paul Ricoeur's phrase).  
Given the pronounced libertarian tone of many current human rights formulations, we 
must not idolize or idealize these formulations, but be open to new wisdom from our 
own religious traditions and those of others.  This is, in part, a “hermeneutic of religious 
freedom” – a new way of thinking about the place of religion in public life and public law 
that goes beyond simple clichés of a wall of separation between church and state, that 
goes beyond the sterile dialectic of state secularism versus religious establishment, and 
that goes beyond the notion that religion is merely a private preoccupation of the 
peculiar and the unenlightened.25 And, this is, in part, a "hermeneutic of history."  While 
acknowledging the fundamental contributions of Enlightenment liberalism to the modern 
rights regime, we must look for the deeper genesis and genius of many modern rights 
norms in religious texts and traditions that antedate the Enlightenment by centuries, 
sometimes millennia.26  We must return to these religious sources.  In part, this is a 
return to ancient sacred texts freed from the casuistic accretions of generations of jurists 
and freed from the cultural trappings of the communities in which these traditions were 
born.  In part, this is a return to slender streams of theological jurisprudence that have 
not been part of the mainstream of the religious traditions, or have become diluted by 
too great a commingling with it.  In part, this is a return to prophetic voices of dissent, 
long purged from traditional religious canons, but, in retrospect, prescient of some of the 
rights roles that the tradition might play today.27   
Little’s own work illustrates how this four-part hermeneutic of religion and human 
rights works in the Western Christian tradition, particularly the Calvinist tradition.  But he 
has also outlined comparable efforts for the Islamic,28 Jewish, and Buddhist traditions, 
which others have developed more fully.29  Let me just touch on a few of the highlights 
of his argument over fifty years about the Christian and other religious foundations and 
dimensions of human rights.  
 
The Calvinist Roots of Rights 
It takes a bit of contextualizing to appreciate the novelty and boldness of Little’s 
argument, particularly his historical argument about the Christian foundations of human 
 
25 Little discusses the importance of Roger Williams’ articulation of the freedom of the conscience, which 
was instrumental in development of the doctrine of the separation of the church and the state, and likely 
influenced Jefferson’s thinking vis-à-vis Locke in Little, “Reformed Tradition,” 21-27. 
26 See Little, “Christian Perspective,” 59-103.  
27 See, e.g., David Little, “Does the Human Right to Freedom of Conscience, Religion, and Belief Have 
Special Status?” Brigham Young University Law Review (2001): 603-10. 
28 Little, Sachedina, and Kelsay, “Christianity, Islam, and Religious Liberty," 225-37. 
29 See David Little, “Rethinking Human Rights: A Review Essay on Religion, Relativism, and Other 
Matters,” Journal of Religious Ethics 27 (Spring 1999).  
rights before the Enlightenment.  Standard college textbooks – from Little’s youthful 
days to our own – have long taught us that the history of human rights began in the later 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  Human rights, we often hear, were products of 
the Western Enlightenment – creations of Grotius and Pufendorf, Locke and Rousseau, 
Montesquieu and Bayle, Hume and Smith, Jefferson and Madison.30  Human rights 
were the mighty new weapons forged by American and French revolutionaries who 
fought in the name of political democracy, personal autonomy, and religious freedom 
against outmoded Christian conceptions of absolute monarchy, aristocratic privilege, 
and religious establishment.  Human rights were the keys that Western liberals finally 
forged to unchain themselves from the shackles of a millennium of Christian oppression 
and Constantinian hegemony.  Human rights were the core ingredients of the new 
democratic constitutional experiments of the later eighteenth century forward. The only 
Christians to have much influence on this development, we are told, were a few early 
Church Fathers who decried pagan Roman persecution, a few brave medievalists who 
defied papal tyranny, and a few early modern Anabaptists who debunked Catholic and 
Protestant persecution. 
Proponents of this conventional historiography have recognized that Western 
writers since classical Greek and Roman times often used the terms “right” or “rights” 
(ius and iura in Latin).  But the conventional argument is that, before the dawn of the 
Enlightenment, the term “right” was usually used in an “objective” rather than a 
“subjective” sense.  “Objective right” (or “rightness”) means that something is the 
objectively right thing or action in the circumstances.  Objective right obtains when 
something is rightly ordered, is just or proper, is considered to be right or appropriate 
when judged against some objective or external standard.31  “Right” is being used here 
as an adjective, not as a noun: It is what is correct or proper -- “due and meet” in 
Victorian English.  Thus when pre-seventeenth century writers spoke of the “natural 
rights” of a person they were really referring to the “natural duties” of a person – the 
right thing for the person to do when judged by an external standard posed by nature or 
by natural reason.32  As the great University of Chicago don, Leo Strauss, put it: 
“Natural right in its classic form is connected with a teleological view of the universe.  All 
natural beings have a natural end, a natural destiny, which determines what kind of 
operation is good for them.  In the case of men, reason is required for discerning these 
operations: reason determines what is by nature right with regard to man’s natural 
end.”33   
Enlightenment philosophers, beginning with Hobbes and Locke, Strauss 
continued, first began to use the term “natural right” in a subjective rather than an 
objective sense.  For the first time in the later seventeenth century, the term “right” was 
 
30 Material in this and the following five paragraphs is drawn from my The Reformation of Rights:  Law, 
Religion, and Human Rights in Early Modern Calvinism (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
20-37.  Parallel citations to Little’s work are included.  
31 Little, “Roger Williams,” 17. 
32 Little, “Human Rights,” 21-22. 
33 Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 7. 
regularly used as a noun not as an adjective.  A “subjective right” was viewed as a 
claim, power, or freedom which nature vests in a subject, in a person.  The subject can 
claim this right against another subject or sovereign, and can have that right vindicated 
before an appropriate authority when the right is threatened, violated, or disrespected.  
The establishment of this subjective understanding of rights is the start to the modern 
discourse of human rights, we are told.  When early Enlightenment figures spoke of 
“natural rights” or the “rights of man according to natural law,” they now meant what we 
usually mean by “rights” today -- the inherent claims that the individual subject has to 
various natural goods like life, liberty, and property.  This was “an entirely new political 
doctrine,” writes Strauss.  It was a fundamental shift “from natural duties to natural 
rights.”34  
Strauss’s historical account of rights is much more nuanced than this, as are the 
later historical accounts of some of his best students.  But, particularly when cast into 
popular secular forms, as it often is, this basic “Straussian” account of the 
Enlightenment origins of Western rights has persisted, with numerous variations, in 
many circles of discourse to this day.  
One of those circles, ironically, is that of conservative Protestantism, particularly 
conservative Calvinism.  Many conservative Calvinists and other Protestants today still 
view human rights with suspicion, if not derision.35  Some view human rights as a part 
and product of dangerous Catholic natural law theories that Calvinists have always 
purportedly rejected.  More view human rights as a dangerous invention of the 
Enlightenment, predicated on a celebration of reason over revelation, of greed over 
charity, of nature over Scripture, of the individual over the community, of the pretended 
sovereignty of humans over the absolute sovereignty of God.  These critics view the 
occasional discussions of natural law and natural rights in Calvin and other early 
reformers as a scholastic hangover that a clearer-eyed reading of Scripture by later 
Calvinists happily expunged from the tradition.  At a certain level of abstraction, this 
conservative Protestant critique of human rights coincides with certain streaks of 
“Straussian” historiography about the Enlightenment origin of rights.  Various 
Straussians dismiss pre-modern Christian rights talk as a betrayal of the Enlightenment.  
Various Protestants dismiss modern Enlightenment rights talk as a betrayal of 
Christianity.   
Whatever the philosophical and theological merits of these respective positions 
might be, the historical readings and narratives that support them can no longer be 
sustained.  A whole cottage industry of important new scholarship has now emerged to 
demonstrate that there was ample “liberty before liberalism,” and that there were many 
subjective human rights in place before there were modern democratic revolutions 
fought in their name.  We now know a great deal more about classical Roman 
understandings of rights, liberties, capabilities, powers and related concepts, and their 
elaboration by medieval and early modern civilians.  We can now pore over an intricate 
 
34 Ibid., 182. 
35 See Little, “Human Rights,” 13-24. 
latticework of arguments about individual and group rights and liberties developed by 
medieval Catholic canonists, philosophers, and theologians, and the ample expansion 
of this medieval handiwork by neo-scholastic writers in early modern Spain and 
Portugal.  And we now know a good deal more about the immense contribution of the 
Protestant reformers to the development and expansion of the Western understanding 
of public, private, penal, and procedural rights.  The Enlightenment, it now appears, was 
not so much a well-spring of Western rights as a watershed in a long stream of rights 
thinking that began more than a millennium before.  While they certainly made their own 
original and critical rights contributions, too, what Enlightenment philosophers 
contributed more than anything were new theoretical frameworks that eventually 
widened these traditional rights formulations into a set of universal claims that were 
universally applicable to all.   
 Little was in the vanguard of scholars in the past half century who have 
excavated some of these earlier historical Christian foundations of human rights and 
who have shown the heavy dependence of Enlightenment figures from Locke36 to 
Jefferson37 on these Christian sources.  And he was one of the first American scholars 
to show clearly and concretely the specific contributions of Calvinists to the 
development of human rights.38  He has always acknowledged the grim and cruel side 
of the Calvinist tradition – from the mistreatment of witches,39 to the hanging of 
Quakers, to the lynching of Zulus, let alone the Calvinist tradition’s ample penchant for 
patriarchy, paternalism, and just plain prudishness that still has not ended.40  He has 
done his hermeneutic of confession.  And he has also acknowledged the powerful 
influence of the European and American Enlightenment movements on our 
understanding of religious and civil rights.   But, in exercising his hermeneutic of 
suspicion, he wants modern liberals and modern Calvinists alike to see what historical 
Calvinism has wrought.  
One major contribution was the Calvinist theory of liberty of conscience, freedom 
of exercise, and equality of a plurality of faiths before the law.41  Some of this one finds 
already in Calvin, Beza, and other early reformers who built on selected Roman, 
patristic, and medieval Catholic sources.42  But it was especially Roger Williams, in the 
seventeenth century, Little has shown, who pressed this thesis to its more radical 
conclusions demanding freedom of all peaceable believers to adopt, adapt, or abandon 
 
36 See Little, “Conscientious Individualism,” 230-42. 
37 See Little, “The Reformed Tradition,” 20-28. 
38 See, e.g., Little, “Roger Williams.” 
39 Little, “Personal Testament,” 62-63. 
40 David Little, “Roger Williams and The Puritan Background of the Establishment Clause,” in No 
Establishment of Religion:  America’s Contribution to Religious Liberty, ed. T. Jeremy Gunn and John 
Witte, Jr. (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 100-124 . 
41 Much of this section is distilled from my Reformation of Rights, chaps. 1-5. Parallel citations to Little’s 
work are included.  Little discusses the controversial and transformative approach of Roger Williams and 
other Presbyterian leaders who advocated tolerance of all religions and atheism in Little, “Religious 
Freedom,” 35-37 and more fully in Little, “Roger Williams and The Puritan Background of the 
Establishment Clause.”  
42 See Little, “Conscientious Individualism,” 230-32. 
their faith, to be free from coercion or undue influence of their conscience, and where 
necessary to be exempt from laws that made demands contrary to the core dictates of 
conscience.43  This view, together with Roger Williams’s own experiment with 
disestablishment of religion in Rhode Island, would become axiomatic for the later 
American constitutional experiment, espoused by Puritans, Civic Republicans, 
Evangelicals, and Enlightenment philosophers alike.  
A second major contribution of the Calvinist tradition to the development of 
Western rights lay in the restructuring of the liberty and order of the church.  Calvin 
himself contributed much to this by combining ingeniously within his ecclesiology the 
principles of rule of law, democracy, and liberty.  Little’s Puritan and Presbyterian 
forbearers drove home the lessons even further.44  Calvinists urged respect for the rule 
of law within the church.  They devised laws that defined the church's doctrines and 
disciplinary standards, the rights and duties of their officers and parishioners, the 
procedures for legislation and adjudication.  The church was thereby protected from the 
intrusions of state law and the sinful vicissitudes of their members.  Church officials 
were limited in their discretion.  Parishioners understood their duties. When new rules 
were issued, they were discussed, promulgated, and well known.  Issues that were ripe 
for review were resolved by proper tribunals.  Parties that had cases to be heard 
exhausted their remedies at church law.  Disgruntled individuals and families that 
departed from the church left their private pews and personal properties behind them.  
Dissenting congregations that seceded from the fold left their properties in the hands of 
the corporate body.  To be sure, this principle of the rule of law within the church was an 
ideal that too often was breached, in Calvin's day and in succeeding generations.45  Yet 
this principle helped to guarantee order, organization, and orthodoxy within the 
Reformed church. 
Calvinists urged respect for the democratic process within the church.  Pastors, 
elders, teachers, and deacons were to be elected to their offices by communicant 
members of the congregation.  Congregations periodically held collective meetings to 
assess the performance of their church officers, to discuss new initiatives within their 
bodies, to debate controversies that had arisen.  Delegates to church synods and 
councils were to be elected by their peers.46  Council meetings were to be open to the 
public and to give standing to parishioners to press their claims.  Implicit in this 
democratic process was a willingness to entertain changes in doctrine, liturgy, and 
polity, to accommodate new visions and insights, to spurn ideas and institutions whose 
utility and veracity were no longer tenable.47  To be sure, this principle did not always 
insulate the church from a belligerent dogmatism in Calvin's day or in the generations to 
follow.  Yet this principle helped to guarantee constant reflection, renewal, and reform 
 
43 Little, “Religious Freedom,” 33-34. 
44 See Little, “Personal Testament,” 57-68. 
45 See Little, “Personal Testament,” 61-64. 
46 Little, “Personal Testament,” 58-59. 
47 David Little, “Reformed Faith and Religious Liberty,” Church and Society (May/June, 1986): 7.  Calvin 
believed the church was to be a community guided in its direction by the community voice and that all 
participation was to be voluntary and consensual. 
within the church – ecclesia reformata semper reformanda, a reformed church 
dedicated to perpetual reformation.48 
And Calvinists urged respect for liberty within the church.  Christian believers 
were to be free to enter and leave the church, free to partake of the church’s offices and 
services without fear of bodily coercion and persecution, free to assemble, worship, 
pray, and partake of the sacraments without fear of political reprisal, free to elect their 
ministers, elders, deacons, and teachers, free to debate and deliberate matters of faith 
and discipline, free to pursue discretionary matters of faith, the adiaphora, without 
undue laws and structures.49  To be sure, this principle, too, was an ideal that Calvin 
and his followers compromised, particularly in their sometimes undue empowerment of 
the consistory and their brutality toward persistent dissenters like Michael Servetus.50  
Yet this principle helped to guarantee constant action, adherence, and agitation for 
reform by individual members of the church.   
Calvinists integrated these three cardinal principles into a new ecclesiology.  
Democratic processes prevented the rule-of-law principle from promoting an ossified 
and outmoded orthodoxy.  The rule of law prevented the democratic principle from 
promoting a faith swayed by fleeting fashions and public opinions.  Individual liberty kept 
both corporate rule and democratic principles from tyrannizing ecclesiastical minorities.  
Together, these principles allowed the church to strike a unique perpetual balance 
between law and liberty, structure and spirit, order and innovation, dogma and 
adiaphora.  And together they helped to render the pluriform Calvinist church 
remarkably resilient over the centuries in numerous countries and cultures.   
This integrated theory of the church had obvious implications for the theory of the 
state.  Calvin himself hinted broadly in his writings that a similar combination of rule of 
law, democratic process, and individual liberty might serve the state equally well.  What 
Calvin adumbrated, his followers elaborated.  In the course of the next two centuries, 
European and American Calvinists wove Calvin's core insights about the nature of 
corporate rule into a robust constitutional theory of republican government, which rested 
on the pillars of rule of law, democratic processes, and individual liberty.51  
A third major contribution that Calvin and his followers made to the Western 
tradition was their healthy respect for human sinfulness, and the need to protect 
institutions of authority from becoming abusive.  Calvinists worked particularly hard to 
ensure that the powerful offices of church and state were not converted into instruments 
of self-gain and self-promotion.  They emphasized the need for popular election of 
ministers and magistrates, limited tenures and rotations of ecclesiastical and political 
 
48 Little, “A Personal Testament,” 57. 
49 Little, “Reformed Faith,” 22-23.  An example of the Reformed tradition’s movement to separate from 
civil authorities is found in the appointment of a committee for reviewing “church organization, including 
the question of church-state relations” by the synods of New York and Philadelphia at the time Jefferson’s 
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office, separation of church and state, separation of powers within church and state, 
checks and balances between and amongst each of these powers, federalist layers of 
authority with shared and severable sovereignty, open meetings in congregations and 
towns, codified canons and laws, transparent proceedings and records within 
consistories, courts, and councils.52  And, if none of these constitutional safeguards 
worked, later Calvinists called for resistance, revolt, and even regicide against tyrants.53  
Calvinists were in the vanguard of the great democratic revolutions of France, Holland, 
England, and America fought in the later sixteenth to later eighteenth centuries.  
A fourth major contribution that Calvinists made to the Western tradition was their 
integrative theory of rights.   Early modern Calvinists insisted that freedoms and 
commandments, rights and duties belong together.  To speak of one without the other is 
ultimately destructive.  Rights without duties to guide them quickly become claims of 
self-indulgence.  Duties without rights to exercise them quickly become sources of deep 
guilt.  Early modern Calvinists further insisted that religious rights and civil rights must 
go together.54  Already in Calvin’s day, the reformers discovered that proper protection 
of religious rights required protection of several correlative rights as well, particularly as 
Calvinists found themselves repressed and persecuted as minorities.  The rights of the 
individual to religious conscience and exercise required attendant rights to assemble, 
speak, worship, evangelize, educate, parent, travel, and more on the basis of their 
beliefs.  The rights of the religious group to worship and govern itself as an 
ecclesiastical polity required attendant rights to legal personality, corporate property, 
collective worship, organized charity, parochial education, freedom of press, freedom of 
contract, freedom of association, and more.  For early modern Calvinists, religious rights 
and civil rights are fundamentally interdependent.  
Finally, early modern Calvinists insisted that human rights are ultimately 
dependent on religious norms and narratives. Calvin and his early followers used the 
Decalogue to ground their theories of religious and civil rights; inviolable religious rights 
were anchored in the first table; fundamental civil rights in the second table.55  This 
would remain a perennial argument in the tradition.  Later Calvinists grounded their 
theories of rights in other familiar doctrinal heads of theology, including the doctrine of 
the Trinity, the creation, and the resurrection.  Some human rights, they argued, are 
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temporal expressions of what Calvin had called the “eternal rights of God.”  These are 
the rights of God the Father, who created humans in his own image and commanded 
them to worship him properly and to obey his law fully. They are the rights of God the 
Son, who embodied himself in the church and demanded the free and full exercise of 
this body upon earth.  And they are the rights of God the Holy Spirit, who is “poured out 
upon all flesh” and governs the consciences of all persons in their pursuit of happiness 
and holiness.  Human rights, Calvinists argued, are in no small part of the right of 
persons to do their duties as image bearers of the Father, as prophets, priests, and 
kings of Christ, as agents, apostles, and ambassadors of the Holy Spirit.  As image 
bearers of God, persons are given natural law, reason, and will to operate as 
responsible creatures with choices and accountability. They are given the natural duty 
and right to reflect God’s glory and majesty in the world, to represent God’s sovereign 
interests in church, state, and society alike.  As prophets, priests, and kings of God, 
persons have the spiritual duty and right to speak and to prophesy, to worship and to 
pastor, to rule and to govern on God’s behalf.  As apostles and ambassadors of God, 
persons have the Christian duty and right to “make disciples of all nations” by word and 
sacrament, by instruction and example, by charity and discipline. 
 
Why Religion and Human Rights Need Each Other 
All this is not a preamble to an altar call, nor an exercise in Protestant 
chauvinism.  It is instead one small illustration of what a rich hermeneutic of religion and 
human rights can offer.  Comparable exercises are now afoot in other Protestant, 
Catholic, and Orthodox Christian communities, as well as in various Islamic, Judaic, 
Buddhist, Hindu, and Traditional communities.  A number of religious traditions have 
begun, of late, this process of engaging or reengaging the regime of human rights, of 
returning to their traditional roots and routes of nurturing and challenging the human 
rights regime.  This process has been incremental, clumsy, controversial, and at times 
even fatal for its proponents.  But it is now underway, and Little has been has a 
trailblazer in showing us the way.  
But just as Little found resistance to human rights in many quarters of his own 
Calvinist community, so modern scholars and advocates in other faith traditions have 
faced resistance, and sometimes violent opposition.  It is one thing, many religious 
skeptics point out, to accept the freedom and autonomy that a human rights regime 
allows.56  This at least gives them unencumbered space to pursue their divine callings.  
It is quite another thing for religious bodies to import human rights within their own 
polities and theologies.  This exposes them to all manner of unseemly challenges.  
Human rights norms, religious skeptics argue, unduly challenge the structure of 
religious bodies.  While human rights norms teach liberty and equality, many religious 
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bodies teach authority and hierarchy.  While human rights norms encourage pluralism 
and diversity, many religious bodies require orthodoxy and uniformity.  While human 
rights norms teach freedoms of speech and petition, several religions teach duties of 
silence and submission.  To draw human rights norms into the structures of religion 
would only seem to embolden members to demand greater access to religious 
governance, greater freedom from religious discipline, greater latitude in the definition of 
religious doctrine and liturgy.  So why import them? 
Moreover, human rights norms challenge the spirit of religious bodies.  Human 
rights norms, religious skeptics argue, are the creed of a secular faith born of 
Enlightenment liberalism, humanism, and rationalism – even if they may have earlier 
religious inspirations.  Human rights advocates today regularly describe these norms as 
our new "civic faith," "our new world religion," "our new global moral language."  The 
French jurist, Karel Vasak, has pressed these sentiments into a full and famous 
confession of the secular spirit of the modern human rights movement:  
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights [of 1948], like 
the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen in 
1789, has had an immense impact throughout the world.  It 
has been called a modern edition of the New Testament, 
and the Magna Carta of humanity, and has become a 
constant source of inspiration for governments, for judges, 
and for national and international legislators.... By 
recognizing the Universal Declaration as a living document 
... one can proclaim one's faith in the future of mankind.57   
In demonstration of this new faith, Vasak converted the "old trinity" of "liberty, 
equality, and fraternity" taught by the French Revolution into a "new trinity" of "three 
generations of rights" for all humanity.  The first generation of civil and political rights 
elaborates the meaning of liberty.58  The second generation of social, cultural, and 
economic rights elaborates the meaning of equality.  The third generation of solidarity 
rights to development, peace, health, the environment, and open communication 
elaborates the meaning of fraternity.  Such language has become not only the lingua 
franca but also something of the lingua sacra of the modern human rights movement. 
In the face of such an overt confession of secular liberalism, religious skeptics 
conclude, a religious body would do well to resist the ideas and institutions of human 
rights.  These skeptical arguments, however, presuppose that human rights norms 
constitute a static belief system born of Enlightenment liberalism.  But the human rights 
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regime is not static.  It is fluid, elastic, and open to challenge and change.  The human 
rights regime is not a fundamental belief system.  It is a relative system of ideas and 
ideals that presupposes the existence of fundamental beliefs and values that will 
constantly shape and reshape it.  The human rights regime is not the child of 
Enlightenment liberalism, nor a ward under its exclusive guardianship.  It is the "ius 
gentium" of our times, the common law of nations, which a variety of ancient religious 
and cultural movements have historically nurtured and which today still needs the 
constant nurture of multiple communities.59   
I use the antique term "ius gentium" advisedly -- to signal the distinctive place of 
human rights as "middle axioms" in our moral and political discourse.  Historically, 
Western writers spoke of a hierarchy of laws – from natural law (ius naturale), to 
common law (the ius gentium), to civil law (the ius civile).  The natural law was the set of 
immutable principles of reason and conscience, which are supreme in authority and 
divinity and must always prevail in instances of dispute.  The civil law was the set of 
enacted laws and procedures of local political communities, reflecting their immediate 
policies and procedures.   
Between these two sets of norms was the ius gentium, the set of principles and 
customs common to several communities and often the basis for treaties and other 
diplomatic conventions.  The contents of the ius gentium did gradually change over time 
and across cultures -- as new interpretations of the natural law were offered, and as 
new formulations of the civil law became increasingly conventional.  But the ius gentium 
was a relatively consistent body of principles by which a person and a people could 
govern themselves.  
This antique typology helps us to understand the intermediate place of human 
rights in our hierarchy of legal norms today.  Human rights are the ius gentium of our 
time, the middle axioms of our discourse.  They are derived from and dependent upon 
the transcendent principles that religious communities (more than any other groups) 
continue to cultivate.  And they inform, and are informed by, shifts in the customs and 
conventions of sundry state law systems.  These human rights norms do gradually 
change over time: just compare the international human rights instruments of 1948 with 
those of today.  But human rights norms are a relatively stable set of ideals by which a 
person and community might be guided and judged.  
This antique typology also helps us to understand the place of human rights 
within religion.  My argument that human rights must have a more prominent place 
within religions today is not an attempt to import libertarian ideals into their theologies 
and polities.  It is not an attempt to herd Trojan horses into churches, synagogues, 
mosques, and temples in order to assail secretly their spirit and structure.  My argument 
is, rather, that religious bodies must again assume their traditional patronage and 
protection of human rights, bringing to this regime their full doctrinal vigor, liturgical 
healing, and moral suasion.  Using our antique typology, religious bodies must again 
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nurture and challenge the middle axioms of the ius gentium with the transcendent 
principles of the ius naturale.  This must not be an effort to monopolize the discourse, 
nor to establish by positive civil law a particular religious construction of human rights.  
Such an effort must be part of a collective discourse of competing understandings of the 
ius naturale – of competing theological views of the divine and the human, of sin and 
salvation, of individuality and community – that will serve constantly to inform and 
reform, to develop and deepen the human rights ideals now in place.   
A number of distinguished commentators have recently encouraged the 
abandonment of the human rights paradigm altogether – as a tried and tired experiment 
that is no longer effective, even a fictional faith whose folly has now been fully exposed. 
Others have bolstered this claim with cultural critiques – that human rights are 
instruments of neo-colonization which the West uses to impose its values on the rest,60 
even toxic compounds that are exported abroad to breed cultural conflict, social 
instability, religious warfare and thus dependence on the West.61  Others have added 
philosophical critiques – that rights talk is the wrong talk for meaningful debate about 
deep questions of justice, peace, and the common good.  Still others have added 
theological critiques – that the secular beliefs in individualism, rationalism, and 
contractarianism inherent to the human rights paradigm cannot be squared with cardinal 
biblical beliefs in creation, redemption, and covenant.  
Such criticisms properly soften the overly-bright optimism of some human rights 
advocates.  They properly curb the modern appetite for the limitless expansion and 
even monopolization of human rights in the quest for toleration, peace, and security.  
And they properly criticize the libertarian accents that still too often dominate our rights 
talk today.  But such criticisms do not support the conclusion that we must abandon the 
human rights paradigm altogether—particularly when no viable alternative global forum 
and no viable alternative universal faith is yet at hand.  Instead, these criticisms support 
the proposition that the religious sources and dimensions of human rights need to be 
more robustly engaged and extended. Human rights norms are not a transient 
libertarian invention, or an ornamental diplomatic convention. Human rights norms have 
grown out of millennium-long religious and cultural traditions. They have traditionally 
provided a forum and focus for subtle and sophisticated philosophical, theological, and 
political reflections on the common good and our common lives. And they have 
emerged today as part of the common law of the emerging world order. We should 
abandon these ancient principles and practices only with trepidation, only with 
explanation, only with articulation of viable alternatives.  For modern academics to stand 
on their tenured liberties to deconstruct human rights without posing real global 
alternatives is to insult the genius and the sacrifice of their many creators. For now, the 
human rights paradigm must stand—if nothing else as the “null hypothesis.” It must be 
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constantly challenged to improve. It should be discarded, however, only on cogent proof 
of a better global norm and practice. 
A number of other distinguished commentators have argued that religion can 
have no place in a modern regime of human rights. Religions might well have been the 
mothers of human rights in earlier eras, perhaps even the midwives of the modern 
human rights revolution. Religion has now, for them, outlived its utility. Indeed, the 
continued insistence of special roles and rights for religion is precisely what has 
introduced the paradoxes of religion and human rights that now befuddle us. Religion is, 
by its nature, too expansionistic and monopolistic, too patriarchal and hierarchical, too 
antithetical to the very ideals of pluralism, toleration, and equality inherent in a human 
rights regime. Purge religion entirely, this argument concludes, and the human rights 
paradigm will thrive. 
This argument proves too much to be practicable. In the course of the twentieth 
century, religion defied the wistful assumptions of the Western academy that the spread 
of Enlightenment reason and science would slowly eclipse the sense of the sacred and 
the sensibility of the superstitious. Religion defied the evil assumptions of Nazis, 
Fascists, and Communists alike that gulags and death camps, iconoclasm and book 
burnings, propaganda and mind controls would inevitably drive religion into extinction.  
Yet another great awakening of religion is upon us—now global in its sweep and 
frightening in its power.   
It is undeniable that religion has been, and still is, a formidable force for both 
political good and political evil, that it has fostered both benevolence and belligerence, 
peace and pathos of untold dimensions.  But the proper response to religious 
belligerence and pathos cannot be to deny that religion exists or to dismiss it to the 
private sphere and sanctuary.  The proper response is to castigate the vices and to 
cultivate the virtues of religion, to confirm those religious teachings and practices that 
are most conducive to human rights, democracy, and rule of law. 
Religion will invariably figure in legal and political life— however forcefully the 
community might seek to repress or deny its value or validity, however cogently the 
academy might logically bracket it from its political and legal calculus.  Religion must be 
dealt with, because it exists—perennially, profoundly, pervasively—in every community.  
It must be drawn into a constructive alliance with a regime of law, democracy, and 
human rights.  And there is no better way to start that exercise than to read the writings 
of David Little.  
 
 
